



The Curious Incident of the Dog that did Bark in 
the Night-Time: What Mischief does Hedley Byrne 
v Heller Correct? 
David Campbell* 
[S]uffering and evil are nature’s admonitions; they cannot be got rid of; and the impatient 
attempts of benevolence to banish them from the world by legislation, before benevolence has 
learned their object and their end, have always been productive of more evil than good.1 
I. Introduction 
It is unarguable that the creation of tort liability for negligent misstatement by the 1963 
House of Lords’ decision in Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd2 has, I 
                                                 
*I am grateful to Allan Beever and Paul Mitchell for their comments. 
1 Editorial, ‘Administration of Towns’ (13 May 1848) 246 The Economist 536. 
2 Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 (HL) (‘Hedley Byrne’). The Court of 
Appeal decision is reported at [1962] 1 QB 396 (CA). The transcript of the unreported High Court judgment of 
McNair J, handed down on 20 December 1960, is held in the House of Lords’ Library. The reference code by 
which it most conveniently may be found by searching the Parliamentary Archives database (Portcullis) is 
HL/PO/JUU/4/3/1107. The transcript can be found in the Appendix to this volume. I am grateful to Paul 
Mitchell and Ms Jennie Lynch of the Parliamentary Archives for help in obtaining this transcript. Due to Ms 
Lynch’s efforts, the entire House of Lords Library file of Hedley Byrne case papers is now open. 
 2 
 
would say in a somewhat supererogatory fashion even at the time,3 and far more so when the 
position is assessed now, as in this volume, very substantially added to the difficulties of the 
doctrinal formulation and the practical application of the law of negligence. It was also a 
first4 jab at the coherence of the contractual doctrine of misrepresentation, prior to the 
knockout blow landed by the Misrepresentation Act 1967 ss 1–2,5 but so far as possible I 
shall avoid the detail of contractual misrepresentation as I wish to focus specifically on tort 
liability outside of contract. The state of the current law in respect of such liability is perhaps 
best captured in the way that Professor Beever has gone so far as to argue that ‘the negligence 
model of negligent misrepresentation is irreparably flawed at its base’, with the compelling 
implication ‘that “negligent misstatement” is a misleading name for the cause of action’.6 
Though Beever generally defends the assumption of responsibility model as an alternative 
justification of Donoghue v Stevenson7 liability,8 this is so in regard of Hedley Byrne liability 
only because he has formerly understood assumption of responsibility sufficiently widely as 
to include assumption in contract, and, as he makes clear in his chapter in this volume, which 
                                                 
3 The incident that led to Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004 (HL) occurred on the night of 21–
22 September 1962 and the writ was issued on 6 February 1965. 
4 This is not strictly correct. The Report that led to the Act was published in 1962: Law Reform Committee, 
Tenth Report: Innocent Misrepresentation (Cmnd 1782, 1962). 
5 Misrepresentation Act 1967 (UK). This most unfortunate statute was immediately subjected to an 
unforgettably thorough exposure of its inadequacies: PS Atiyah and GH Treitel, ‘Misrepresentation Act 1967’ 
(1967) 30 MLR 369. 
6 A Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 282, 283.  
7 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL). 
8 Beever (n 6) 304–10, replying to K Barker, ‘Unreliable Assumptions in the Modern Law of Negligence’ 
(1993) 103 LQR 461. 
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identifies assumption of responsibility with contract, this is an entirely different matter to 
what we shall see it is quite wrong to call assumption of responsibility in tort. 
In this chapter, I will argue that, putting fraud and ‘particular’ ‘special relationships’ 
to one side, contract is the only legitimate basis of liability for negligent misstatement, but I 
will do so in a way which, as our understandings of consideration and contract (and indeed 
Donoghue liability) are by no means congruent, and as I confine the meaning of ‘assumption 
of responsibility’ to the claimed justification of tortious liability,9 significantly differs from 
Beever’s. Though I will say something about both the negligence and the assumption of 
responsibility models, and give, I trust, a novel statement of the reason why the latter signally 
fails to ground negligent misstatement, I will not enter into the detail of the case law or the 
academic literature after Hedley Byrne. I write this chapter to argue that, as nothing of value 
has been gained by the creation of the tort of negligent misstatement, the best way to avoid 
the difficulties it has generated is not to try to make it reasonably justiciable but to abolish it. 
I am generally inclined to abolish the tort of negligence as it has been given shape by 
Donoghue, and in particular I am convinced that the personal injury system should be 
abolished.10 But the personal injury system at least addresses, however inadequately, the 
undoubted mischief of injury inflicted on a claimant who (let us allow for the purposes of 
                                                 
9 I put to one side the way that Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas) [2009] 1 AC 61 
(HL) has unarguably brought tortious assumption of responsibility into the core of the law of contract, with 
results which we are in the process of finding out, but as should have been clear from the start, are, with respect, 
most unwelcome. 
10 D Harris, D Campbell and R Halson, Remedies in Contract and Tort, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) ch 24 and D Campbell, ‘Interpersonal Justice and Actual Choice as Ways of 
Determining Personal Injury Law and Policy’ (forthcoming 2015) Legal Studies. 
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argument) played no part other than that of passive victim.11 In contrast, the negligent 
misstatement claimant played an essential active part in causing the loss by voluntarily 
relying on the statement in order to gain an economic benefit, and as her reliance on the 
statement being non-negligent is completely unjustifiable by the standard which we normally 
use to decide whether an economic benefit has been legitimately obtained, which is that it has 
been paid for, there is normally no possibility of ‘reasonable reliance’ on a negligent 
misstatement. 
In Silver Blaze, one of the most successful of the Sherlock Holmes stories, in which 
a dog did not bark at a man with criminal intent who by night entered premises the dog was 
guarding is recognised by Holmes as a ‘curious incident’ which is the key to unravelling the 
crime.12 The dog should have barked but didn’t. Hedley Byrne is an incident which gives rise 
to a curiosity of an opposite sort. There would not merely have been nothing wrong in 
leaving Hedley Byrne and Co to bear its loss, but it would have entirely been right to do so. 
To those, like myself, who believe that voluntary exchange should prima facie be the means 
of obtaining economic goods, there appears to be no good general reason not to use the law of 
contract to determine the extent of the legal protection of reliance on others’ statements. 
Certainly the law after Hedley Byrne discloses no such reason. Hedley Byrne itself addressed 
no actual mischief, and that it was from the outset worse than pointless has rendered the law 
of negligent misstatement particularly open to incoherent judicial legislation, whether that 
                                                 
11 I put to one side the specific issues of liability for negligent misstatement leading to personal injury: Phelps v 
Hillingdon LBC [2001] 2 AC 619 (HL).  
12 I am not the first to attempt to put Holmes’ reasoning here to theoretical use. I am aware that I follow in the 
footsteps of the late Ronald Coase: RH Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law (Chicago Ill., University of 
Chicago Press, 1986) 58. No doubt there are other precursors of whom I am unaware. 
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legislation is analysed using the negligence or the assumption of responsibility models. 
Hedley Byrne is a curious incident of a dog barking when there was nothing to bark about. 
And, as anyone who has a dog knows, there is very little that is more annoying. 
I must confess that I cannot claim much originality for my criticism of Hedley Byrne 
itself. Leaving aside the contributions of numerous others, before Hedley Byrne had even 
appeared in The Law Reports, the essence of what I will say had been said by the late Mr 
Weir in the first of those casenotes which established his mastery of the form.13 But I do hope 
to explain why the House of Lords barked when it had no need to do so, and to sort out the 
misunderstandings about the nature of economic action that evidently still continue to 
confound our evaluation of Hedley Byrne. 
II. The Mischief in Hedley Byrne 
Though I have in a sense done so, it is wrong to say that Hedley Byrne created liability for 
negligent misstatement. Rather, it expanded such liability beyond the bounds identified with 
Derry v Peek,14 which had been felt to be excessively constraining in a number of cases, the 
most important of which was Candler v Crane, Christmas and Co.15 It was, of course, 
perfectly possible at the time of Derry v Peek that making an incorrect statement could lead 
to legal liability. I will return to the issue of what the bounds identified with Derry v Peek 
                                                 
13 AJ Weir, ‘Liability for Syntax’ [1963] CLJ 216. 
14 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 (HL). 
15 Candler v Crane, Christmas and Co [1951] 2 KB 164 (CA). 
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actually were, but for now let us just take them to be fraud, contract,16 a fiduciary relationship 
derived from a contract, or a non-contractual ‘special relationship’ found by the courts to 
exist ‘in particular cases’.17 Though I do not purport to give anything like a complete account 
of the doctrinal background of Hedley Byrne, I propose to begin by turning, not to the case 
itself, but to the dissent of Denning LJ in Candler,18 which Hedley Byrne effectively made 
into law.19 
In Candler, the claimant invested £2,000 (now circa £75,000) in a mine in reliance 
on a statement of the mine’s accounts by its owner’s accountants, the defendant. The 
investment proved disastrous and the £2,000, as well as other subsequent investments of 
money and labour by the claimant, were lost. There was no question that the accounts were 
prepared negligently and there was no question of proximity, for an employee of the 
defendant, at the mine owner’s request, discussed the matter with the claimant and the mine 
owner.20 The case focused on whether the defendant had been fraudulent, and so liable under 
                                                 
16 At the cost of stating what should be obvious, let me point out that negligently making a statement would 
breach the duty to take reasonable care which is of the essence of a contract to provide professional advice and 
the like now codified under the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 (UK) s 13. Exclusion of this liability is 
now regulated under s 16 and, behind this, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UK) and the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, SI 1999/3159 (UK). It is, of course, possible to contract for strict 
liability for a statement’s being incorrect, but it is extremely difficult to conceive of a party making a statement 
on this basis. 
17 See the text accompanying n 73 below. I again put to one side specific issues arising from the recognition of 
liability for negligent misstatement leading to physical harm. 
18 Candler (n 15) 174–85. 
19 Lord Denning, The Discipline of Law (London, Butterworths, 1979) 237: ‘Fourteen years later my dissent in 
Candler v Crane Christmas was approved by the House of Lords’. 
20 Issues surrounding the employee’s capacity to bind his employer were discussed.  
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Derry v Peek, or negligent, and so not liable, on the same authority as interpreted in Le Lievre 
v Gould.21 
The problem in Candler was caused by the mine owner, who was a scoundrel who 
both harried and misled his accountants (their negligence in the preparation of the accounts 
was nevertheless unquestionable) and badly mismanaged the mine, including misusing the 
£2,000. Both the mine company and the owner personally became insolvent, so the claimant 
turned to the defendant, establishing that he would not have made his investment were it not 
for the negligent accounts. In the absence of fraud by the defendant or a contractual 
relationship between it and the claimant, Cohen and Asquith LJJ found for the defendant. But 
they were perfectly conscious that, proximity being no issue at all, their doing so ran against 
the climate established by Donoghue, and Denning LJ was invited to read his dissenting 
judgment first. Behind the ‘point of law of much importance’,22 whether there was a duty of 
care, Denning LJ saw adopting liability on the Donoghue basis as the correction of an ‘error 
… which appears time and time again in nineteenth century thought, namely, that no one who 
is not a party to a contract can sue on it or on anything arising out of it’.23 This error led to 
injustice which was a denial of civilisation: 
Now I come to the great question in the case: did the accountants owe a duty of care to the 
plaintiff? If the matter were free from authority, I should have said that they clearly did owe a 
duty of care to him. They were professional accountants who prepared and put before him 
these accounts, knowing that he was going to be guided by them in making an investment in 
                                                 
21 Le Lievre v Gould [1893] 1 QB 491 (CA). 
22 Candler (n 15) 174.  
23 ibid 177. 
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the company. On the faith of those accounts he did make the investment, whereas if the 
accounts had been carefully prepared, he would not have made the investment at all. The 
result is that he has lost his money. In the circumstances, had he not every right to rely on the 
accounts being prepared with proper care; and is he not entitled to redress from the 
accountants on whom he relied? I say that he is, and I would apply to this case the words of 
Knight Bruce LJ in an analogous case ninety years ago: ‘A country whose administration of 
justice did not afford redress in a case of the present description would not be in a state of 
civilisation’.24 
Before turning to Hedley Byrne, I wish to stress what I would call the tendentiousness 
of Denning LJ’s approach. It is all a matter of the claimant, self-evidently from the answer to 
the rhetorical question asked, having a ‘right’ which ‘entitled’ him to ‘redress’, and therefore 
of the defendant’s corollary duty to provide the redress. There is no question of anything that 
the claimant had to do to be owed the duty, other than suffer a loss. This approach, and 
indeed unconsciously its tendentiousness, was overwhelmingly warmly welcomed in 
commentary on Candler, with the majority decision itself coming in for strong criticism. 
Aubrey Diamond, then Reader in Law at the London School of Economics, saw it as ‘an 
unrealistic decision’ preserving an outmoded reluctance to compensate ‘pecuniary [ie pure 
economic] loss’.25 Diamond concluded that ‘the dissenting judgment of Lord Justice Denning 
should be established as the true legal rule’.26 
                                                 
24 ibid 176, quoting Slim v Croucher (1860) 1 De GF & J 518, 527; 45 ER 462, 466. 
25 A Diamond, ‘The Law of Contract and Tort’ in G Gardiner and A Martin (eds), Law Reform NOW (London, 




I will be extremely brief about the facts of Hedley Byrne, which will be thoroughly 
well known to any reader of this chapter. When considering whether to undertake advertising 
work for a manufacturer which put it at a particular financial risk of up to £9,000 (now circa 
£175,000), the claimant advertising agency sought a credit reference from its bank. The bank 
made inquiry of the defendants, the manufacturer’s bank, and was given what it understood to 
be a satisfactory reference,27 the substance of which it communicated to the claimant. When 
the manufacturer shortly thereafter went into liquidation, leaving the claimant with the loss it 
feared, the claimant brought the action in what was to become negligent misstatement against 
the defendant. 
These facts are, of course, on a first look, similar to those of Candler, but they were 
significantly different, especially as regards two important points. First, though it was found 
to be so,28 the balanced way in which it gave the credit reference raises, in my opinion, a 
serious question whether the defendant was negligent at all, and, however this is, it certainly 
was less culpable than the defendant in Candler. Secondly, the claimant’s bank sought the 
reference on the basis that it would be given ‘without responsibility on [the defendant’s] 
                                                 
27 I myself do not understand, on the basis of the reported facts, the conduct of the claimant’s bank, or, more 
accurately, how that conduct escaped criticism.  
28 Lord Devlin described ‘a reference which was so carelessly phrased that it led the [claimant] to believe the 
traders to be creditworthy when in fact they were not’: Hedley Byrne (HL) (n 2) 515. As will emerge, I cannot 
agree with this. The text of the reference is given in the statements of the facts in the Court of Appeal and House 
of Lords reports. I can confirm this text almost exactly reproduces accepted testimony before McNair J. Though 
I will not advance a close examination of a document which previously has effectively not been publicly 
available, the discussion of the matter before McNair J is very helpfully more extensive. The defendant argued 
that the reference was very guarded and indeed contained ‘red lights’ about the manufacturer. McNair J rejected 
this and saw the reference as ‘a favourable reference without any real qualification’. This involved him placing 
little or no weight on evidence about the way the reference would be understood by bankers, nor, strikingly, on 
evidence that the claimant’s Company Secretary summarised the telephone conversation thus: ‘phoned Bank 
who gave a fair but guarded report’!.  
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part’,29 and it was so given. I shall return to both of these points. But for present purposes we 
should note that, given the disclaimer, the Lords were not going to find liability in Hedley 
Byrne itself,30 although in their anxiety to create tortious liability for negligent misstatement 
in the future they nevertheless somewhat desperately seized on the case, and this desperation 
is one reason why Hedley Byrne is so unsatisfactory.31 Its facts were not nearly so compelling 
as those in Candler, and using them as the pretext for this major judicial legislation does 
seem particularly unwise: ‘travelling to the village church via the moon’ as Honoré 
unforgettably put it.32 
In regard of the issue I want to address, the reason these pains were taken emerges 
most clearly from the speech of Lord Devlin, who thought: 
[T]hat the law, if settled as [the majority in Candler settled it], would be defective. As well as 
being defective in the sense that it would leave a man without a remedy where he ought to 
have one and where it is well within the scope of the law to give him one, it would also be 
profoundly illogical. The [defendants] in this case cannot deny that they were performing a 
service. Their sheet anchor is that they were performing it gratuitously and therefore no 
liability for its performance can arise. My Lords, in my opinion this is not the law. A promise 
                                                 
29 Hedley Byrne (HL) (n 2) 198. 
30 ibid 533 (Lord Devlin): ‘A man cannot be said voluntarily to be undertaking a responsibility if at the very 
moment when he is said to be accepting it he declares that in fact he is not’. It very arguably was the possibility of 
changing the law without effectively retrospectively legislating against the defendant that made Hedley Byrne seem so 
opportune an occasion for judicial legislation. 
31 One cannot but wonder about how satisfactory the claimants found Hedley Byrne when it became clear that 
law reform had been funded by their taking an action they had tantamount to no hope of winning so far as the 
Lords! As private litigation, an aspect from which it is almost never viewed, Hedley Byrne is quite surreal. 
32 AM Honoré, ‘Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd’ (1965) 8 Journal of the Society of Public 
Teachers of Law NS 284, 291. 
 11 
 
given without consideration to perform a service cannot be enforced as a contract by the 
promisee; but if the service is in fact performed and done negligently, the promisee can 
recover in an action in tort … it is true that this principle of law has not yet been clearly 
applied to a case where the service which the defendant undertakes to perform is or includes 
the obtaining and imparting of information. But I cannot see why it should not be; there is 
ample authority to justify … saying now that the categories of special relationships which may 
give rise to a duty to take care in word as well as in deed are not limited to contractual 
relationships or to relationships of fiduciary duty, but include also relationships which … are 
‘equivalent to contract’, that is, where there is an assumption of responsibility in 
circumstances in which, but for the absence of consideration, there would be a contract.33 
I want to add only the observation I made about Candler: all this is tendentiously addressed 
just to the duty of the defendant and nothing is said about anything the claimant has to do to 
obtain the benefit of that duty. 
The problem that, of course, immediately arises from this, the discussion of which 
surely would now form a substantial library, is that, by going beyond contract and 
consideration one goes beyond privity, and having got rid of contractual boundaries to 
liability, one has to set tortious boundaries. I will simply say without argument that setting 
those boundaries on the basis of proximity understood as reasonable foreseeability, however 
this is in its turn understood, manifestly cannot work in respect of a tort which will have its 
                                                 
33 Hedley Byrne (HL) (n 2) 516, 526, 528–29. As is universally known but as I shall discuss, Lord Devlin 
derived the phrase ‘equivalent to contract’ from the speech of Lord Shaw in Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] 
AC 932 (HL) 972. Lord Shaw, ibid, 971, had himself noted the use of the phrase ‘equivalent to a contract’ in the 
argument of Sir Roundell Palmer QC in Peek v Gurney (1871–72) LR 13 Eq 79 (Ch) 97. By this route, 
Chancery pleadings seeking to avoid liability for what, in a normal contractual situation, was a blatant 
intentional misrepresentation made in the wake of the Overend Gurney scandal, have become a pillar of the 
English law of expanded, non-contractual liability for negligent misstatement. See the text accompanying n 81. 
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main application in cases of pure economic loss.34 Other than to disavow any impression I 
may just have given that I believe that reasonable foreseeability is generally workable in 
respect of other forms of negligently caused loss, I have nothing more to say about the 
negligence model of liability for misstatement, and I turn to the additional ‘special 
relationship’ that has almost always been thought necessary to limit the reach of such 
liability,35 sometimes to the point it entirely displaces it, and specifically to the assumption of 
responsibility model of that relationship. 
 How can a party legitimately come to rely on another party’s assumption of legal 
responsibility for a negligently made statement? It should contract.36 If a party contractually 
agrees to provide professional advice or the like, the justification for then holding it 
responsible in this way is that it actually has voluntarily undertaken the responsibility. One 
might say that the mark of this is that the party has received a consideration, but one must 
understand that consideration at least purports to be the mark of the actual reason the party 
has undertaken that responsibility, which is, not gratuitously to benefit the other party, but to 
obtain a bargained-for benefit through exchange. The reach of contractual liability will not be 
confined to the theoretical paradigm of a bilateral express bargain supported by a discrete 
payment. The doctrines of consideration and privity have never showed such inflexibility,37 
                                                 
34 NJ McBride and A Hughes, ‘Hedley Byrne in the House of Lords: An Interpretation’ (1995) 15 Legal Studies 
376. 
35 I put to one side all the ratiocination involved in attempting to work the special relationship back into the core 
of proximity as reasonable foreseeability.  
36 MP Gergen, ‘Negligent Misrepresentation as Contract’ (2013) 101 California Law Review 953. 
37 An instructive example of a ‘contractual structure’ may be found in Norwich City Council v Harvey [1989] 1 
WLR 828 (CA). I fully acknowledge that the recognition of an implicit intention to create a third party 
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and this was recognised by Derry v Peek, not to speak of Hedley Byrne, unproblematically 
including ‘fiduciary relationships’ among the grounds of liability. 
Now, even in a contractual context the categories of fiduciary relationships are not 
closed, and indeed their proliferation has on occasions proven hard to keep in check, but 
when they arise from contracts, fiduciary relationships do (or should) partake of the essential 
quality of being paid for. But the whole point of Hedley Byrne was to move beyond 
contractual liability. One way in which this was bound to happen was that the understanding 
of ‘fiduciary’ as it related to negligence would be expanded so that its connection with 
contract was broken.38 But, more importantly, this was merely a subordinate part of what was 
essential to the assumption of responsibility model, which is that it is used to describe 
situations about which the last thing that could be said was that there actually was an 
assumption of responsibility. 
Lord Devlin’s identification of a category of ‘relationships which … are “equivalent 
to contract”, that is, where there is an assumption of responsibility in circumstances in which, 
but for the absence of consideration, there would be a contract’,39 was intended ‘to settle the 
law so that the presence or absence of consideration makes no difference’.40 But a contract 
without consideration is not a contract, and by ‘equivalent to contract’ Lord Devlin meant 
something entirely different to contract. This, with the greatest respect but one has to say, 
                                                                                                                                                        
beneficiary in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties Act) 1999 (UK), s 1(1)(b) has substantially improved the 
contractual position with regard to Hedley Byrne situations. 
38 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL) 205 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
39 Hedley Byrne (HL) (n 2) 529. 
40 ibid 532. 
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very unhelpful equivocation was at the heart of the assumption of responsibility model from 
the outset. 
Summarising the speeches of his brethren in Hedley Byrne, Lord Devlin said: ‘I do 
not understand any of your Lordships to hold that it is a responsibility imposed by law upon 
certain types of persons or in certain sorts of situations. It is a responsibility that is voluntarily 
accepted or undertaken’.41 I can neither interpret this as a flat inability to understand the 
issue, which I find hard to attribute to this most intellectually gifted of judges, nor as 
ratiocination aimed at unscrupulously getting one’s way, which I find almost as hard to 
attribute to this most decent of legal professional men. I will try to explain how Lord Devlin 
came to see things this way below. But, however this is, he avoided the basic issue. One can 
voluntarily make a statement and indeed intend it be relied upon, but whether one voluntarily 
assumes the indemnification of the reliance is a quite separate matter. This can be determined 
by assessing what the parties intended, which is a matter of contractual interpretation, or be 
determined by imposing the indemnification and then reading this back into the ‘voluntary’ 
assumption of responsibility. The more that the assumption of responsibility model is based 
on the Henderson v Merrett ‘objective’ assumption of responsibility,42 the more it departs 
from a voluntary assumption of responsibility, as was latent in Hedley Byrne from the 
outset.43 It is not going far enough to say that, if one decouples ‘voluntary’ and ‘assumption’, 
one decouples ‘assumption’ from its legitimate meaning in a way of which only Humpty 
                                                 
41 ibid 530. 
42 Phelps (n 11) 654 (Lord Slynn): ‘assumption of responsibility by the person concerned … means simply that 
the law recognises that there is a duty of care. It is not so much that responsibility is assumed as that it is 
recognised or imposed by the law’. 
43 I refer the reader back to Barker (n 8) and to the response in Beever (n 6) 304–10. 
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Dumpty could approve. One is, in fact, calling an imposition an assumption in a Newspeak 
fashion of which only Minitrue could approve.44 
I would hope to be allowed to claim, on the basis of previous work, that I am not 
insensitive to the shortcomings of the law of contract in general or the doctrine of 
consideration in particular. But I nevertheless can clearly recall the incredulity with which I 
read the following 1998 dicta of Lord Steyn in Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd: 
[T]he restricted conception of contract in English law, resulting from the combined effect of 
the principles of consideration and privity of contract, was the backcloth against which Hedley 
Byrne was decided and the principle developed in Henderson’s case … while the present 
structure of English contract law remains intact the law of tort, as the general law, has to fulfil 
an essential gap-filling role. In these circumstances there was, and is, no better rationalisation 
for the relevant head of tort liability than assumption of responsibility.45 
Was Lord Steyn really saying that defects in the law of contract meant that we should turn to 
negligence? I thought it significant that, if this was his position, he seemed unaware that it 
repeated the argument made by Professor Markesinis a decade earlier that an ‘expanding tort 
law’ was ‘the price of a rigid contract law’.46 This argument was an encomium to the House 
of Lords’ decision in Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd,47 of which our appellate judges had 
                                                 
44 Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 (HL) 839D: ‘If, and to the extent that, an assumption of responsibility is 
essential for the recovery of pure economic loss in damages there is no logical reason why such assumption of 
responsibility has to be voluntary if the relationship between the parties or the nature of the service provided is 
such that an assumption of responsibility can be deemed or inferred or imposed by the law’. 
45 Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830 (HL) 837D–F. 
46 BS Markesinis, ‘An Expanding Tort Law: The Price of a Rigid Contract Law’ (1987) 103 LQR 354. 
47 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520 (HL). In the haste to advance negligence, the possibility 
of contractual liability in Junior Books was never, in my opinion, properly considered. Junior Books was 
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in that intervening decade become so ashamed that they tried to airbrush it from legal history 
in a manner most unusual if not unique, effectively overruling it in the Court of Appeal.48 
One immediately thinks that Lord Steyn proposed to jump from the frying pan into the fire, 
but this is not enough. He proposed to jump from a sometimes uncomfortably hot bath into a 
ladle of molten metal. Though Lord Steyn simply discounted it,49 I have nothing to add to 
Professor Hepple’s conclusion, based on a compelling comparative assessment of the ways 
the law has been advanced in contract and in negligence, that ‘The way to create liability in 
situations “equivalent to contract” was surely to broaden the conception of contract’.50 
What I might add to Hepple, however, is to say that Lord Steyn did not really have 
specific defects in the law of contract in mind. He had it in mind that contract was defective 
tout court.51 He found it unacceptable that contract could place limits on the indemnification 
of a claimant when the defendant objectively had assumed responsibility. This position is 
                                                                                                                                                        
influentially analysed as turning on an assumption of responsibility akin to Hedley Byrne: Yuen Kun Yeu v AG of 
Hong Kong [1988] 1 AC 175 (PC) 196E–97C.  
48 Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd (No 2) [1988] QB 758 (CA) 784 (Dillon LJ). I do not 
deny that Junior Books still haunts the current law as an instance of the very attitude which it is the purpose of 
this chapter to criticise: eg Plant Construction plc v Clive Adam Associates (a firm) (Ford Motor Co, Third 
Party) (1997) 55 Construction Law Reports 41 (CA), an unsuccessful attempt to revive something akin to 
Junior Books liability in the wake of Henderson v Merrett. 
49 Williams (n 45) 837D. 
50 B Hepple, ‘Negligence: The Search for Coherence’ (1997) 50 Current Legal Problems 67, 88. The essence of 
Hepple’s argument had been made with reference to Junior Books as well as Hedley Byrne in JG Fleming, 
‘Comparative Law of Torts’ (1984) 4 OJLS 235, 240–1. 
51 His chilling threat in Williams (n 45) 837F, that the Lords might find it ‘necessary … to re-examine the 
principles of consideration and privity of contract’ has not been carried out, but that the threat was made is 
indicative of a cast of mind. However, one is pleased to say that Lord Steyn’s principal contractual innovation, 
formal acknowledgement of reasonable expectations, has so far been on balance a clear benefit, but this is 
because it is in best part a formalisation and not really an innovation at all.  
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tenable only if one has a complete lack of sympathy with the core value of liberal economics, 
which is the autonomy of economic actors institutionalised in freedom of choice or contract. 
It overwhelmingly is the case that such consideration as economics occasionally 
receives from those whose strength is in law is framed in terms of evaluating the efficiency 
with which, as it is very tellingly put, ‘society’s resources’ are utilised. It is undeniable that 
the law of negligent misstatement, indeed of negligence and much other rights discourse, has 
proceeded in blithe ignorance or disregard of the fact that the creation of rights imposes costs 
as well as confers benefits. But even when it is realised that taking a decision to indemnify 
reliance on a statement imposes costs, the issue is viewed from the theoretical perspective of 
a planner who is able to determine whether the contractual outcome or the tortious outcome is 
superior. This implies that the planner, speaking on behalf of ‘society’, is cognisant of an 
optimal use of society’s resources and can decide which outcome best approximates to it.52 
The criticism I have so far made on Hepple’s authority is one of lack of 
computational competence. How can the thinking Lord Steyn expresses dare to claim that it 
can identify an optimal use and assess an outcome’s proximity to it? It can’t. But this is not 
the main point, which is that it shouldn’t. When an economic actor chooses to rely on a 
statement, then, as the statement could be wrong, the actor creates and bears a risk. Whether 
and to what extent the actor nevertheless chooses to rely is, in the first instance, a personal 
matter. But it is no longer a personal matter if reliance includes indemnification of the risk 
that the statement is wrong, for this requires the actor to obtain the good of indemnification 
                                                 
52 Weir has the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne ‘on a trip to Mount Olympus’, but I fear his criticism, of 
something done in the swinging sixties, is not confined to the point I am trying to make: T Weir, ‘Errare 
Humanum Est’ in P Birks (ed), Frontiers of Liability, vol 2 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994) 105 n 12. 
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from another. Putting aside direct indemnification by the government, indemnification may 
be bought from the party making the statement (or from an insurer, a situation I shall put to 
one side). How much, if any, indemnification should an actor buy? If the economy is one 
which respects the actor’s choice, then no one can know other than the actor herself. The 
choice is a function of both the situation the actor faces and her capacity to decide, and that 
capacity to decide is, precisely, hers, expressing her status as an autonomous actor. In 
advance of the buyer ‘revealing’ her preferences by her choice, it is senseless to talk of 
having the information by which the optimum can be determined and so approximations to 
that optimum assessed, for the optimum is derived from the choice, and if an optimum is 
chosen by someone other than the actor, it is not an optimum. 
Liberal democratic society’s basic claim to legitimacy rests not on the moral value 
of particular social goals set by that society, but on the extent of the freedom of its citizens to 
set their own goals. One may say that the goal of liberal democratic society should be to 
eschew the pursuit of particular social goals and to maintain neutrality between the goals set 
by its citizens. In particular, the claim that the market economy is efficient is not a claim that 
that economy efficiently produces a particular set of morally valued goods but that goods are 
produced according to the choices of economic actors. 
In the rather formal, but I think helpful to those who I anticipate might read this 
chapter, terms of neo-classical economics, the first theorem of welfare economics, Pareto 
optimality, identifies a perfectly efficient distribution of goods as an equilibrium established 
under conditions of general competition in which mutually beneficial exchanges have taken 
place in complete accordance with the voluntary choices of economic actors. Under general 
competition, goods will be exchanged up to the point where the increase in one actor’s 
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utilities achieved by further exchange would be more than offset by the diminution in the sum 
of another actor’s. At this point, the market is in equilibrium because there are no further 
mutually beneficial exchange opportunities and, vitally importantly, it has been brought there 
by the uncoordinated working out of voluntary exchanges, which automatically identify the 
point of Pareto optimality by reaching equilibrium. The beautiful symmetry of the model lies 
in its being driven by voluntary exchange and working only because it is so driven. This is 
the source of the power of the rejection of ‘patterned principles’ of distribution in favour of 
the ‘pure procedure’ of the market in liberal political philosophy, for any state imposition of a 
‘fair’ distribution of goods must prevent the perfectly efficient distribution which would be 
voluntarily reached at general competitive equilibrium. Efficiency, in sum, is not a matter of 
the achievement of an objectively determined optimum but the actualisation of a procedure in 
which the optimum is identified by the voluntary choices of economic actors. 
Under general competition, transacting is costless and so economic actors’ choices 
are made with perfect information and are perfectly well expressed in the actors’ 
negotiations. Such general competition is, of course, purely theoretical, and the concept of 
Pareto optimality is akin to what Kant called a ‘regulative’ idea or principle. It states an end 
which is of great value in ordering our thought and action, though it is not vouchsafed to us to 
realise that end. Pareto optimality allows us to understand the nature of autonomous 
economic action, but it is of no direct value at all to the analysis of any empirical process of 
Pareto optimisation, of which the complete satisfaction of voluntary choices is the 
unrealisable but nevertheless essential goal. Under all empirical conditions of choice, with 
information and negotiation costly and imperfect, risk is universal, and the way one handles 
this risk is a most important part of one’s qualities as an autonomous economic actor. 
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It makes no sense whatsoever to speak of handling only the upside of risk. Unless 
there is a possibility of suffering the consequences of one’s mistakes, one cannot make an 
economic choice. There is a very compelling argument that the possibilities both of making a 
gain and of suffering a loss provide the best incentives to rational economic action. But it is 
much more important to acknowledge that autonomous economic choice cannot exist without 
the possibility of success and failure. If the government intervenes to prevent or limit either 
or both by means backed by its monopoly of violence, this is a coercive overriding of 
autonomy, and the political justification of such intervention is possible only if this is 
acknowledged at the outset. As Kant himself somewhat imperfectly understood, autonomy is 
by no means the only value which a system of (social) justice, as opposed to a system of 
(personal) morality, must respect, and such justification is entirely possible. Practical welfare 
economics have to contemplate many second, not first, best choices which are given effect by 
coercive transfers, the principle of which runs entirely counter to Pareto optimality. 
Nevertheless, the technicalities of neo-classical economics are expressive of fundamental 
moral rights and duties which emerge from acknowledging the autonomy, and therefore 
responsibility, of economic actors. 
It is, as a normal case, economically irrational and, what is the same thing, morally 
unjust that one’s choice to rely on a statement is legally indemnified without one having to 
pay for the benefit of the indemnification. Exactly the wrong position about this was 
established by Hedley Byrne and then adopted, and of course extended, in the cases which 
have found liability on the basis of it. The process, one trusts, reached its doctrinal 
culmination in Henderson v Merrett, which, in its opening of the possibility of 
indemnification, effectively by everyone who ultimately pays the costs of insurance, of 
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certain claimants who categorically should in private law have suffered the consequences of 
their contractual position,53 is the second most unjustifiable modern case I can recall in 
almost 40 years of study of English private law.54 That the finding of tort liability extended 
the limitation period to the advantage of the claimants seems to have been treated as the 
justification of that finding,55 a deplorable petitio principii wholly expressive of the 
tendentiousness of Hedley Byrne reasoning. 
I hope I am not putting words in his mouth if I say that, in the casenote on Hedley 
Byrne I have mentioned, Weir said all that I would like to say about what was done in that 
case, and I will quote him by way of conclusion of this section of this chapter: 
Now a law journal is no place for considerations of justice, but a glance at the plaintiffs in 
[the] line of cases [culminating in Hedley Byrne] reveals that their claims to redress are not 
indisputably high. They made bad business deals, having taken only a free opinion before 
hazarding their wealth in the hope of profit, no part of which, had it eventuated, would they 
have transferred to the honest person whom they now seek to saddle with their loss. The 
defectiveness of a system which refuses in such a case to sever the risk of loss from the chance 
of profit is not obvious. It would admittedly be defective if it were made impossible for the 
                                                 
53 There were, of course, numerous distinguishable classes of claimants, whose specific positions turned on 
various issues, in this case and in all the associated litigation, and I intend my remarks to apply only to the 
limitation issue. I put it to one side that the plight of these claimants was itself substantially caused by 
preposterous negligence litigation. 
54 The most unjustifiable is Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106 (Ch). This is an impeccable contract judgment 
by one of the greatest equity judges of recent times, but it was an occasion of national and international disgrace 
that the matter was treated as one of private law at all.  
55 Henderson (n 38) 194A (Lord Goff): ‘I do not find it objectionable that the claimant may be entitled to take 
advantage of the remedy which is most advantageous to him’. The qualification which Lord Goff immediately 
goes on to make to this is, with respect, precisely what it is the burden of his speech to completely undermine. 
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investor to share the risk, but … the plaintiffs here could have found a credit investigation 
agency; had they done so, the system would have afforded them a remedy, through the 
appropriately commercial institution of contract, against such of their advisers as were 
careless; the risk on the adviser would be justified by the fee. One can hope, perhaps, that in 
most cases it will continue to be ‘reasonable’ to rely only on a word one has bought … A free 
tip is relevantly distinguishable from a remunerated opinion.56 
III. Why Was Contract Thought Not To Be Good Enough? 
I want briefly to add to what I have just said, which focused on the position of the claimant, 
by reversing the focus and looking at the position of the defendant. What I want to say 
conveniently emerges from the following hypothetical example given by Lord Devlin: 
If a defendant says to a plaintiff: ‘Let me do this for you; do not waste your money in 
employing a professional, I will do it for nothing and you can rely on me’, I do not think he 
could escape liability simply because he belonged to no profession or calling, had no 
qualifications or special skill and did not hold himself out as having any. The relevance of 
these factors is to show the unlikelihood of a defendant in such circumstances assuming a 
legal responsibility, and as such they may often be decisive. But they are not theoretically 
conclusive and so cannot be the subject of definition. It would be unfortunate if they were.57 
The process of contractual negotiation gives the party making the statement the opportunity 
to determine the extent of its own liability with precision according to its own preferences. 
One possibility is that it could agree to indemnify the statement gratuitously, but this could 
                                                 
56 Weir (n 13) 218–19. See further n 72. 
57 Hedley Byrne (HL) (n 2) 531. 
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only be done by the clearest words and would best be done backed by nominal consideration, 
a device which has been subject to much undeserved (as well as much deserved) criticism.58 
Can liability for negligent misstatement based on an assumption of responsibility which it is 
simply a pretence to say is voluntary, and so cannot be as fine grained as contract and must, 
when appellate courts shift the boundaries of negligence, periodically spring surprises of a 
sort the general principles of the common law of contract are an attempt to avoid, be thought 
to be superior to this? 
The best possible justification of Hedley Byrne would be that it was a response by 
the law of tort to a situation in which the law of contract had proven to work unacceptably 
badly; an instance of, to use the welfare economics term, market failure.59 But the comments 
I have made on Lord Steyn’s position in Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd apply 
equally to Denning LJ in Candler and the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne. They did not seek 
to identify defects in the law of contract. Their views were too blunt to explore the 
possibilities of market failure in any detailed sense, but this was as well as it would be 
                                                 
58 Even in Weir (n 13) 219. 
59 Neoclassical economics by no means claim that the establishment of a Pareto optimal equilibrium conveys 
approval of the moral or political substance of that equilibrium. An equilibrium produced by the voluntary 
choices of consumers of pornography is not morally justified because it is produced by voluntary choices. Nor 
does an equilibrium’s being efficient carry any connotation that it is just, for it is efficient based on the 
underlying distribution of endowment, and this may be unjust. So an intervention, such as extending free 
indemnification in the circumstances of Yianni v Edwin Evans and Sons [1982] QB 483 (QB); approved in 
Smith (n 44), might be claimed to be a justified redistribution. The difficulties of the justification are, of course, 
as nothing to appellate courts which believe themselves to know and to be able to give effect to the ‘notions of 
distributive justice’ of ‘the ordinary person’: White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 
455 (HL) 510E. But for those unable to make this assumption, Herculean in Dworkin’s sense, this is, I am 
afraid, the statement not of a solution, but of a very profound problem indeed. If one had sat down to write an 
examination problem requiring appreciation of this, one could not have done better than raise the issues 
considered so wisely, but unavailingly, in the dissent of Aldous LJ in the deplorable Merrett v Babb [2001] QB 
1174 (CA) [65]–[87]. 
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preposterous to maintain that the claimants in those cases were, or in the typical Hedley 
Byrne case are, ‘vulnerable’ or anything other than contractually competent. This bluntness 
was thought good enough because it was believed that the law of contract tout court had 
failed. My argument has been that there is no mischief addressed in Hedley Byrne. The dog 
barked when there was nothing to bark at. But, of course, it was believed that there was a 
mischief. It was the law of contract itself. 
This is most apparent, of course, in those cases of concurrent liability such as 
Henderson v Merrett where negligence sets aside contractual limitations. I am conscious that 
I have not paid sufficient attention to the fact that Heller and Partners Ltd was not actually 
found liable. However, I do not propose to discuss the detailed relationship of contract and 
tortious liabilities as it has been developed after Hedley Byrne, for though that detail is of the 
greatest importance to parties in situations at wherever the boundary of negligence liability 
currently is drawn, it is the basic overriding of contract by tort that is of relevance here. It 
perhaps shows that Hedley Byrne was heard prior to Dorset Yacht that we have seen that Lord 
Devlin feared that it would have stretched credulity to have claimed that the defendant had 
voluntarily assumed responsibility for a statement which was given with a categorical express 
disclaimer. But, of course, the possibility of tort trumping even a crystal clear expression of 
contractual intention was always latent in Hedley Byrne. It was not the ratio of the case, but it 
was, if I can put it this way, its principle. Though it is a principle which is, with respect, 
impossible to justify in economic terms, and, once the nature of economic action is properly 
understood, is therefore also unjustifiable in moral and legal terms, I think I know why that 
principle was advanced. 
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I have earlier cited Diamond’s views as an illustration of the general criticism of the 
majority decision in Candler.60 I was led to these views by Professor Paul Mitchell’s 
excellent chapter on Hedley Byrne in Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort,61 on which I have 
relied heavily. Those views were particularly interesting given Diamond’s general stance, but 
also, as Mitchell leads one to realise, particularly politically influential, not only because of 
Diamond’s own eminence, but because they were the commentary on contract and tort in a 
very influential collection published in 1963 under the auspices of the Society of Labour 
Lawyers: Law Reform NOW.62 One of the editors of the collection, Gerald Gardiner QC, had 
led for the claimants in the Lords and was shortly to become Lord Chancellor in the Wilson 
Government of 1964–70, and so was the Chancellor under whom the Misrepresentation Act 
was passed. 
This Government was the last British government of the post-war ‘Golden Age of 
capitalism’, a historically unprecedented period of continued economic success on growth, 
employment and inflation measures that led to a confidence about state direction of economic 
and social policy which now seems so extraordinary that it is difficult even to adequately 
understand it in the sociological sense of ‘recapturing an experience’.63 The political 
                                                 
60 See the text accompanying n 25. 
61 P Mitchell, ‘Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd (1963)’ in C Mitchell and P Mitchell (eds), 
Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 171, 182. 
62 In a brief introduction to a 1983 attempt to repeat the success of Law Reform NOW, Lord Gardiner told us that 
‘The book was of undoubted assistance to those of us who were concerned with the major measures of law 
reform carried out by the Government which was elected in October 1964’: Lord Gardiner, ‘Introduction’ in A 
Martin and P Archer (eds), More Law Reform NOW (Chichester: Barry Rose, 1983) ix. 
63 Chapters 7-13 of John Campbell’s recent biography of Roy Jenkins capture the atmosphere engendered by a ‘most 
optimistic assumption of ever increasing growth and future material abundance’ on which the Golden Age Labour Party 
formed its policies: J Campbell, Roy Jenkins, A Well-rounded Life (London: Jonathan Cape, 2014) 181.  
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aspiration of this Government remains identified with the speech, his first Conference speech 
as Leader of the Opposition, that Wilson had given to the 1963 Labour Party Conference, in 
which he saw his Party engaged ‘in redefining and … restating … Socialism in terms of the 
scientific revolution’, in order to make that socialism adequate for ‘The Britain that is going 
to be forged in the white heat of [that] revolution’.64 At a more general and profound level, 
that aspiration was given theoretical expression by the Labour intellectual and senior 
politician Tony Crosland, who held various offices as a Cabinet colleague of Lord Gardiner 
under Wilson. Crosland’s representative and at the time extremely influential views turned on 
his belief, as stated in 1956, that ‘the political authority has emerged as the final arbiter of 
economic life [and the] era of unfettered market relations is over’, and so competent was this 
authority’s economic management that ‘questions of economic efficiency’ were no longer ‘of 
primary importance’ in a Britain which stood ‘on the threshold of mass abundance’.65 Were 
he then to have been asked whether the UK continued to be ‘capitalist’, Crosland would have 
answered ‘no’.66 Though, so far as I am aware, Crosland did not directly refer to this most 
famous expression of post-capitalist belief within British economic thought, his views were 
entirely framed within Keynes’ claim that ‘the economic problem’ was in the process of 
being solved.67 
                                                 
64 H Wilson, Labour’s Plan for Science, speech given to the Annual Conference of the Labour Party (1 October 
1963): http://nottspolitics.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Labours-Plan-for-science.pdf,.  
65 CAR Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London, Jonathan Cape, 1956) 73, 515. 
66 ibid 76. 
67 JM Keynes, ‘Essays in Persuasion’ in Collected Writings, vol 9 (London, Macmillan, 1971) 325–26. Crosland 
(n 64) 528 quotes a different passage from the ‘Essays’ ibid 529 to similar effect, and also quotes at 377 a 
passage from ‘The General Theory’ which, though directly addressing returns on capital, famously 
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This belief lies behind Hedley Byrne, albeit, I admit, at some considerable remove. 
In Hedley Byrne itself and in the cases such as Candler which led up to it, the appellate courts 
were conscious of law and convention, which highly constrained judicial legislation, but the 
Lords in Hedley Byrne nevertheless did as they did, and others have certainly enlarged upon 
their work.68 They took this step because they felt compelled to extend compensation, right, 
justice, etc beyond the economic limitations which give the law of contract what they saw as 
its inherently defective shape, effectively regarding the huge possibilities of judicial 
legislation opened to the law of negligence by Donoghue as imposing a duty upon those who 
know what is right and have the power to correct what is wrong to take such steps. A process 
of disillusion, which can be argued to have first been manifested in the UK in the precipitous 
decline in the fortunes, reputation and morale of the 1964–70 Government,69 now means that 
we rarely speak in such high-flown terms as Denning LJ’s furthering of civilisation,70 but the 
motivation of current appellate reasoning about negligence is not substantially different from 
Denning LJ’s in 1951 or Lord Devlin’s in 1964. In all of this, ‘assumption of responsibility’ 
has been used to misdescribe ‘imposition of liability’, and it is disturbing that what it seems 
most apt to describe as a trick can be traced to one of the standing of Lord Devlin. Such a 
                                                                                                                                                        
contemplated a post-capitalist situation: JM Keynes, ‘The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money’ 
in Collected Writings, vol 7 (London, Macmillan, 1973) 221. 
68 R Buxton, ‘How the Common Law Gets Made: Hedley Byrne and Other Cautionary Tales’ (2009) 125 LQR 
60. 
69 Even as regards the scientific revolution which was Wilson’s particular focus, his Government quickly came 
to be seen as a rather dismal failure: D Edgerton, ‘The “White Heat” Revisited: The British Government and 
Technology in the 1960s’ (1996) 7 Twentieth Century British History 53. 
70 The sophisticated are, indeed, ritually guarded in the claims they make: D Campbell, ‘Of Coase and Corn: A 
(Sort of) Defence of Private Nuisance’ (2000) 63 MLR 197, 203–05. 
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figure can act in such a way only when motivated by what one of the two greatest of modern 
philosophers has long shown to be a dreadfully deceptive lure: militant virtue.71 
IV. What Did Derry v Peek Decide? 
Though it is tangential to my argument, I want briefly to say something about the way that 
Derry v Peek, regarded as the ultimate culprit when accounting for the inadequate reach of 
liability prior to Hedley Byrne and the Misrepresentation Act, has been interpreted. I again do 
not purport to engage in detail with the relevant law.72 I will flatly make some claims about 
Derry v Peek and then apply what I have said to Candler and Hedley Byrne. 
Derry v Peek did not confine liability for misrepresentation to fraud. One element of 
its ratio was that liability in the tort of deceit had to be based on proof of ‘actual fraud’.73 
Another element was that liability for negligence normally had to be grounded in contract, 
                                                 
71 GWF Hegel, The Philosophy of History (New York, NY, Dover, 1956) 450: ‘Robespierre set up the principle 
of Virtue as supreme, and it may be said that with this man Virtue was an earnest matter’. 
72 In particular, I have, when quoting a passage from Weir in the text accompanying n 56, omitted his references 
to Cann v Willson (1888) 39 Ch D 39 (Ch) and Woods v Martins Bank [1959] 1 QB 55 (Leeds Assizes). Subject 
to the note of caution I am about to enter about the way we should approach the statements of the meaning of 
fraud and related concepts in nineteenth-century cases, I regard these cases as amenable to the analysis of 
Candler I am about to put forward, and I have not come across a case which I regard as outright contradicting 
my views, including Le Lievre (n 21). 
73 As was confirmed by Lord Haldane LC in Nocton (n 33) 947. What actual fraud was is, one has to 
acknowledge, very unclear even in this purportedly clarifying statement. It certainly was more than intent to 
defraud. But this is not easy to reconcile with Derry v Peek itself.  
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but contract, ‘implied as well as express’,74 could incorporate fiduciary relationships.75 Other 
non-contractual ‘special relationships’ could be and had been found by the courts ‘to exist in 
particular cases’.76 All this was, of course, wholly arguable, and the initially residual category 
of special relationship has come to dominate the law of negligent misstatement in response to 
the perceived shortcomings of contract tout court.77 But, putting aside the general inaccuracy 
of this perception, it is even wrong to say that Derry v Peek meant that contract could not 
flexibly generate negligence liability. However, for this to work properly, such liability has to 
be seen alongside fraud, and this is precisely what has not happened in many decisions 
believed to be constrained by Derry v Peek. 
 In Derry v Peek, a prospectus drawn up by directors seeking to encourage investment 
in their limited company included a seriously misleading statement about a very important 
aspect of the legal position of the company. This was found to have induced the claimant’s 
disastrous investment,78 but, given the finding that the statement was not made fraudulently, 
it was right that the claimant investor had no remedy. His investment took the form of a 
purchase of equity and, to point out the obvious, the reason he had recourse to litigation was 
that his holding was rendered worthless when the company was wound up. An action brought 
                                                 
74 This is taken from the attempt by Lord Haldane LC to correct ‘the great mistake’ of taking an ‘exaggerated 
view … of the scope of the decision in Derry v Peek’ in Robinson v National Bank of Scotland Ltd [1916] SC 
(HL) 154, 157, expressly repeating the warning he had given about this in Nocton (n 33) 946–49. 
75 Robinson (n 73) 157. 
76 ibid. 
77 A very perceptive (if, in terms of the position taken in this chapter, quite wrong) casenote on the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in Hedley Byrne clearly grasped the potential of the gap between ‘fiduciary’ and ‘special’: G 
Dworkin, ‘The Value of a Banker’s Reference’ (1962) 25 MLR 246, 247.  




against the directors personally failed, but this was the result of the working of incorporation 
and limited liability, not of the law of contract. One may deplore this, as I myself do,79 but 
one cannot base company law, including investment in shares, on limited liability and then 
just pierce the veil when it suits.80 
 It is of course entirely right that the veil is pierced when fraud is found, but it is clear 
that in Derry v Peek and a great number of similar cases of the period an enthusiasm to 
encourage entrepreneurship which the contemporary sensibility finds so extreme that it 
cannot be of any relevance to the development of current law lay behind the high threshold 
placed on a finding of actual fraud. In Peek v Gurney, the defendants did not even deny that 
they had intentionally misled the claimant investor in the most serious way, but they did so 
thinking it was best for all concerned, including the investor, that he (and the entire public) 
should be kept in the dark so that the company could flourish to the benefit of all. It was only 
after it had been given extensive consideration that a defence that the crucial information had 
been, as the Master of the Rolls who heard the case put it, ‘honestly concealed from the 
public’,81 was rejected.82 Though Derry v Peek was right to set the threshold of fraud high, it 
must be understood in the context of Victorian understandings of entrepreneurship which are 
an outright barrier to its being in this respect a useful source of law today. Trying to do 
                                                 
79 D Campbell and S Griffin, ‘Enron and the End of Corporate Governance’ in S MacLeod (ed), Global 
Governance and the Quest for Justice, vol 2, Corporate Governance (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006). 
80 As Lord Haldane LC pointed out in Nocton (n 33) 949, statutory regulation of the issuing of prospectuses 
which sought to respond to Derry v Peek was passed shortly after the Lords’ decision.  
81 Peek (n 33) 107 (Lord Romilly MR); affd on this point Peek v Gurney (1873) LR 6 HL 377 (HL). 
82 I am given to understand that possible ‘defences’ of this sort have been eliminated from the definition of fraud 
by false representation under the Fraud Act 2006 (UK) s 2. 
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otherwise is like basing contemporary views of the responsibilities of a woman on reading 
The Old Curiosity Shop, long after Wilde had passed the modern judgement on the character 
and conduct of Little Nell.83 
The finding in Candler that the advice was drawn up merely negligently but not 
fraudulently is questionable. But, accepting it, I still remain at a loss to understand why fraud 
was nevertheless not found in that case. In the contractual law of misrepresentation, a 
statement of opinion is not actionable. Liability has been found, however, in cases such as 
Smith v Land and House Property Corp,84 which are now of indisputable authority, because a 
party stating an opinion makes an implicit statement of fact that she honestly and reasonably 
believes the opinion. Recalling the facts of Candler, it is inconceivable that the defendant’s 
employee honestly believed that his advice, drawn up under pressure in extreme haste, which 
made proper checking impossible, would have been thought sound by the claimant if the 
claimant had known of these circumstances. This, I am sure, is, and I submit was, fraud. The 
defendant’s employee might have honestly believed what he stated was true. He could not 
possibly have honestly believed that what he stated was not negligent. 
Hedley Byrne was quite different and I regretfully must return to just how very bad a 
case it was to explain this aspect of it. It is in my view most implausible to think the advice 
given was negligent. If it was negligent, then it would have been fraudulent to represent it as 
                                                 
83 I think that what I am about to say goes a long way to explaining the judgment actually reached by the Court 
of Appeal in Peek v Derry (1887) 37 Ch D 541 (CA) 565–94. But I will not pursue this as my position is that 
these are now matters for legal history, not legal argument. 
84 Smith v Land and House Property Corp (1885) 28 Ch D 7 (CA). 
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good advice. The steps taken in Hedley Byrne were taken because there was no fraud. But 
there was no fraud because there was no negligence! 
It would be absurd to maintain that Derry v Peek has not led to a great many 
problems, which persist.85 Proof of fraudulent intent is very difficult and civil proceedings 
are not really the best place to try to deal with such difficulty. One cannot, however, entirely 
regret this as a successful proof leads to liability to the remedies for deceit, and by far the best 
possible description of the law on this point is simply to say that it throws the book at the 
defendant. In my opinion, the issue fundamentally is one of drawing the boundary between 
criminal and civil liability which was canvassed in Rookes v Barnard,86 and since that case 
we have done no more to improve the law of deceit in this respect than we have improved the 
law of exemplary damages.87 But if we put this to one side, then I submit that the criticism of 
Derry v Peek that underlies Hedley Byrne is much overdone. Even with all its defects, the law 
of fraud and contractual liability in Derry v Peek could have provided a perfectly satisfactory 
way of dealing with Candler and with Hedley Byrne itself. It would not, however, have been 
the way those who thought the law of contract was itself the problem would have wished. In 
                                                 
85 They are the background to the less satisfactory aspects of the important recent judgment of Leggatt J in Yam 
Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd [2013] EWHC 111, 1 All ER (Comm) 1321 (QB). See D 
Campbell, ‘Good Faith and the Ubiquity of the “Relational” Contract’ (2014) 77 MLR 475. Limitations of space 
meant that I was unable in this comment to draw attention to how far Lord Haldane had, in Nocton v Lord 
Ashburton and in Robinson v National Bank of Scotland Ltd, himself stressed a general duty of honesty. 
86 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL). Lord Devlin, Lord Hodson, Lord Pearce and Lord Reid heard both 
this case and Hedley Byrne. The atmosphere of the civil proceedings in the tranche of cases around Peek v 
Gurney and Derry v Peek was very heavily influenced by the (threat of) criminal prosecution of the defendants.  
87 I am conscious of my shortcomings in having no idea of how to pursue what seem to be the possibilities of 
doing this, which are opened by the availability of a compensation order under the Powers of the Criminal 
Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (UK), s 130 following conviction under the Fraud Act 2006, s 1.  
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Hedley Byrne, it would have been its opposite, and it was this entirely correct outcome that 
was thought a mischief in Hedley Byrne. 
V. Conclusion 
I want to try to make my argument in this chapter as clear as possible by concluding on a 
personal note rightly found rare in academic writing and for which I apologise. I have 
nevertheless been led to do this because of criticisms of previous statements of my views. If I 
knew another way to achieve this clarification, I would take it. 
I am a socialist whose political views are, I hope, a not unmediated but certainly 
clear enough, reflection of his having been born in 1958 into a working class, mining 
community in the north-east of England. My family, most of the friends of my childhood and 
adolescence, and myself have been greatly enriched by the British welfare state. A necessary 
condition of my now being an academic writing this chapter was my being provided with a 
very heavily subsidised grammar school, undergraduate and postgraduate education by the 
welfare state. In all my work, including this chapter, I wish to defend the welfare state. But 
the contemporary welfare state extends far beyond the essentially Beveridgean bounds within 
which it is legitimate, and it is now besmirched, one might even say characterised, by 
interventions based on utterly slovenly economic and political arguments. These are given 
effect by government action which cannot respect legality otherwise it could not give them 
effect, and they require coercive transfers at a scale which is unacceptably restrictive of the 
economic freedom of common citizens. The way to defend such a welfare state is to shrink it. 
I believe that the compensation culture is the major obstacle to doing this. One constituent of 
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the compensation culture is selfishness, but by far the more problematic constituent is the 
impulse to do good in the sense of conferring benefits on others without properly considering 
the cost of doing so. The compensation culture does not arise from a bilateral relationship 
between the claimant and those who ultimately must pay. It is a trilateral relationship in 
which the claimant’s claim is made possible by gatekeepers who, by use of state power, 
command private and public funds derived from those ultimate payers. 
The quality of the appellate reasoning following Hedley Byrne is abysmal. I have 
feared for as long as I have believed I have been able to form a judgement about this, perhaps 
now some 30 years, that teaching students legal reasoning by taking them through this stuff 
as if it was law is bound to lead to disrespect of the value of legality.88 I continue to believe it 
does, though, of course, there are far worse culprits at work in contemporary law schools. But 
what the law of negligence and these other culprits make clear is that in the maximalist 
welfare state the, as it were, prohibitory function of respect for legality has been very much 
diminished.89 The great sense in Dicey is that there are some improving government actions 
that can be done only at such a cost to legality that they should not be done. Dicey has had to 
be ridiculed in order to allow the administrative law of the welfare state to greenlight 
precisely actions of that sort.90 The public/private hybrid of the tort of negligence is judicial 
                                                 
88 Rather than teach this as law, it would be better to ask students to determine how many of Fuller’s ways of 
failing to make law are demonstrated in Hedley Byrne cases.  
89 I adopt the term maximalist from Norman Barry: N Barry, Welfare (Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 
1990) 105. Of the practice of law in the maximalist welfare state, Barry tells us that ‘lawyers have become … 
less concerned with the adjudication of cases and more with the implementation of what they believe are 
socially acceptable values’; N Barry, ‘The Classical Theory of Law’ (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 283, 291.  
90 D Campbell, ‘Gathering the Water: Abuse of Rights after the Recognition of Government Failure’ (2010) 7 
The Journal Jurisprudence 487, 507–31. 
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lawmaking by the courts which is the equivalent of much administrative lawmaking by the 
government, that is to say, in an important sense, not the making of law at all, except that, 
because it is legislated in court, negligence achieves what one would have thought very 
difficult by being generally much poorer, despite the normally infinitely higher quality of 
those doing the lawmaking. It is here that I am pleased to be in fundamental agreement with 
Beever, of some of whose views I have implicitly been critical: negligence as it now is goes 
far beyond what is possible if the regulation of the relevant relationships, inevitably 
ultimately a matter of coercion by the state, is, as it should be, a matter of lawful91 
institutionalisation of fundamental private rights.92 
But, without going further into the matter, Beever’s approach is based on severing 
legal right from economic reasoning, and this fails to capture the intimate intertwining of 
economy and law in ‘the system of natural liberty’ that is the basis of the legitimacy of liberal 
democratic society and which it should be our general aim to actualise.93 The policy behind 
Hedley Byrne is economically irrational, and it is for this reason that it is morally wrong and 
the law of the attempt to give it effect is absurd. It is only because most of those involved in 
pleading, deciding and commenting upon negligent misstatement are so keen to do good that 
they do not appreciate the economic and legal costs of doing so until they absolutely must 
that we are in the position we are in. The fundamental problem of the compensation culture is 
                                                 
91 Beever (n 6) 512–15.  
92 A Beever, ‘Our Most Fundamental Rights’ in D Noland and A Robertson (eds), Rights and Private Law 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) 64. 
93 A Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 2 vols (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976) 687. I believe that the only possible 
justification of socialism is that it is necessary, as Orwell put it, ‘to preserve and even enlarge the atmosphere of 
liberalism’: G Orwell, ‘Inside the Whale’ in Complete Works, vol 12, A Patriot After All (London, Secker and 
Warburg, 2001) 110. 
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not the ugly demands of those who directly gain from it but the beautiful complaisance of the 
Ladies Bountiful who bestow its riches,94 their reward in this world being the pleasure 
derived from the consciousness of spending others’ money better than they would 
themselves. 
                                                 
94 At least Farquhar’s Lady Bountiful expended her own fortune in order to perform the ‘Miracles’ she believed 
herself ‘to have done … about the Country here’, and it was the happiness of her own daughter that she 
(inadvertently) put at risk when, partly because of the generosity of her nature but also partly in response to 
flattery of her ‘Charity, Goodness, Benevolence, Skill and Ability’, she allowed the designing Aimwell and 
Archer into her household: G Farquhar, ‘The Beaux Stratagem’ in Shirley Strum Kenny (ed), The Works of 
George Farquhar, vol 2 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988) 206.  
